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2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case arises from an appeal of a final judgment entered after a trial on the
merits before the Honorable David L. Mower, Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete
County. Therefore, jurisdiction is proper under Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Plaintiffs Robert K. Young and Wynn P. Young ("Youngs") have appealed from
two aspects of the trial court proceedings: (1) Judge Mower's decision after a trial on the
merits not to grant specific performance of Youngs' claimed oral agreement for the
purchase of a parcel of real property, and (2) an order entered prior to trial by Judge Ray
Harding Sr. to disqualify Judge K. L. Mclff as the trial judge. The Youngs have
completely misstated the standard of review that applies to the issues. Patterson
Construction, Inc. ("Patterson Construction") submits that the issues raised by the appeal
and correct standard of review are as follows:
1.

Specific Performance.
Did Judge Mower err in ruling that the Youngs waived or terminated their

oral agreement to purchase the subject property by withdrawing their purchase
money from escrow?
Did Judge Mower err in ruling that any alleged oral agreement to put the
transaction on hold indefinitely was too vague to be specifically enforced?
These issues challenge the trial court's findings of fact, which challenge is
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. See Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342

1
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(Utah 1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998); lohnson v.
Higlev, 977 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Ut. App. 1999); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). This court cannot
even address plaintiffs' challenge to Judge Mower's factual findings, however, because
plaintiffs have failed to marshal I the evidence. See Young, 979 P.2d at 334. Judge
Mower's decision not to grant specific performance is subject to review only for abuse of
discretion. Morris v. Svkes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981); Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d
653 (Utah App. 1997).
2.

Disqualification.
Did Judge Harding err in procedure or in substance by disqualifying Judge

Mclff as the trial judge under Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
The disqualification of the trial judge should not be reviewable "since litigants
cannot be harmed by having to proceed before another judge who is not disqualified."
13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3553, at 652
(1984); see, e ^ , Hampton v. Chicago, 643 F.2d 478, 479 (7th Cir. 1981). If the
decision to disqualify is reviewable at all, it would be under an abuse of discretion
standard of review. Cf. State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988) (failure of a judge to
recuse himself does not constitute reversible error "absent a showing of actual bias or an
abuse of discretion").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
The Youngs filed this action seeking specific performance of an alleged oral

agreement with defendants Edwin Donald Olsen, Jay Donald Olsen, and Scott Douglas
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Olsen ("Olsens") to purchase a parcel of property located near Sterling, Utah. The
Olsens conveyed the property to Patterson Construction pursuant to a warranty deed
recorded September 2 1 , 1994, nine months after the Youngs had terminated an escrow
for the purchase of the property from the Olsens by withdrawing their purchase money.
In addition to specific performance, the Youngs asserted claims for fraud, tortious
interference with contract, and quiet title. Patterson Construction counterclaimed
seeking an order quieting title to the property in its favor as a bona fide purchaser.
The case was originally assigned to Judge K. L. Mclff. Judge Mclff was disqualified
from hearing the case under Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, so the case
was heard by Judge David L. Mower. Judge Mower bifurcated the case to first consider
the Youngs' equitable claim for specific performance. After conducting a bench trial
limited to specific performance, Judge Mower ruled that the Youngs were not entitled to
specific performance. The Youngs' appeal is directed to Judge Mower's decision not to
grant specific performance and to the disqualification of Judge Mclff.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
Plaintiffs' verified complaint in this matter was filed on October 13, 1994 and was

originally assigned to Judge Mclff. [R. 1-35.]1 Defendant Larry Patterson filed an
affidavit to disqualify Judge Mclff pursuant to Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

1

The Youngs refer to their Third Amended Complaint [appellants' brief p. 5] and
attach it to their brief as Addendum A. However, the court did not grant the Youngs'
motion to amend the pleadings a third time. In fact, the court put it "on hold" at the end
of the trial. [R. 2003 at 487-488.]
3
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Procedure. [R. 2052-2107.] On January 26, 1996, Judge Mclff entered an order
directing certification of the disqualification affidavit to Judge Boyd L. Park.
[R. 2166-2194.] Defendant Larry Patterson objected to the order based on Judge Mclff s
inclusion of references to additional portions of the record. [R. 2214-2219.] Based on
that objection, Judge Mclff withdrew his initial certification order and issued a new order
recertifying the affidavit for review by Judge Ray M. Harding Sr. of the Fourth Judicial
District Court. [R. 2265-2272.] Defendant Larry Patterson objected to the recertification
procedure and petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ to vacate the
orders of certification. [R. 2006 and 2007.]
On September 3, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court filed its decision in Young v.
Patterson, 922 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1996), clarifying the procedure to be followed regarding
disqualification affidavits under Rule 63(b). [R. 2335-2336.] The disqualification
affidavit of Larry Patterson was then referred to Judge Ray M. Harding Sr. of the Fourth
Judicial District Court to determine the affidavit's sufficiency.
On October 3 1 , 1996, Judge Harding issued a memorandum decision concluding
that (1) counter affidavits would not assist the court in determining the legal sufficiency
of the affidavit filed by Larry Patterson, and (2) Judge Mclff s prior representation as an
attorney of one of the defendants, Don Olsen, was a proper ground for disqualification.
[R. 2377-2379.] 2 Accordingly, Judge Harding ordered that the case be assigned to a

2

A copy of Judge Harding's Memorandum Decision dated October 30, 1996 is
attached as Addendum E to appellants' brief.
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judge other than Judge Mclff for disposition. The case was then assigned to Judge
Mower.
On August 13, 1997, Judge Mower entered an order bifurcating the trial ordering
that the case would proceed first with a bench trial on plaintiffs' claim for specific
performance and that the court would schedule a jury trial on the Youngs' tort claim of
intentional interference, if necessary, at the conclusion of the bench trial. [R. 1617.] 3
A bench trial was held before Judge Mower on August 20 and 2 1 , 1997. The
scope of the bench trial was limited to whether the court would grant specific
performance of an alleged oral purchase agreement between the Youngs and Olsens for
the purchase and sale of the subject property. [R. 2002 at 43-44.] At the conclusion of
the bench trial, Judge Mower took the case under advisement. Judge Mower
subsequently issued a written decision on October 15, 1997 concluding that the Youngs
waived and terminated their claimed oral agreement to purchase the subject property
when they withdrew their money from the escrow agent, Central Utah Title.
[R. 1713-1725.] 4 Judge Mower further ruled that any alleged oral agreement that the
purchase money could be withdrawn from the escrow and the transaction put on hold
indefinitely was too vague and open ended for specific performance. [Id.] Judge Mower
entered a judgment quieting title to the property in favor of Patterson Construction on

3

The trial transcript is included in the record in two volumes. Volume I is designated
as R, 2002, Volume II as R. 2003.]
4

A copy of Judge Mower's decision is included as Addendum A to this brief.
5
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November 19, 1997. [R. 1791-1793.] 5 After remaining claims were resolved
concerning compensation to Patterson Construction for plaintiffs' occupancy of the
property, the Youngs filed their notice of appeal on April 8, 1999.
C.

Statement of Facts.
In the fall of 1992, Don Olsen and Robert Young had discussions regarding the sale

and purchase of a ten-acre parcel of real property and eleven shares of Sterling Irrigation
Company. [R. 2002 at 53, 113; 1717-1718 (Findings of Fact 1 10).] During the 1991
and 1992 growing seasons, the Youngs had farmed the subject property by agreement
with Don Olsen, along with adjoining properties owned by other parties. [R. 2002 at
113, 162, 164; 1717 (Findings of Fact 1 6).] Don Olsen told Robert Young that he
needed to sell the subject property and water stock by November 16, 1992 in order to
help him avoid a pending bank foreclosure of Olsen's home. [R. 2002 at 53-54, 114,
404, 415; 1 71 7 (Findings of Fact 11 7-10).]
In early November 1992, Don Olsen and Robert Young reached a verbal
agreement to sell and purchase the subject real property and water stock and agreed that
the sale would be closed through an escrow at Central Utah Title Company in Ephraim,
Utah. [R. 2002 at 55-56, 9 1 , 120; 1718 (Findings of Fact 1 1 1 1 , 1 2 ) . ] The Youngs
applied to the Bank of Ephraim for a loan to finance the purchase. The bank agreed to
loan the Youngs $8,500 to be secured by a trust deed against the subject property and
by a pledge of the water stock. The bank conditioned its loan upon title to the subject

5

A copy of the November 19, 1997 Judgment is attached as Addendum B to this
brief.
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property being clear of all liens and encumbrances and the issuance by Central Utah
Title of a policy of title insurance to insure the first lien priority of the trust deed. Nd.1
Those conditions were stated in a letter of instructions from the Bank of Ephraim to
Central Utah Title dated November 13, 1992 [R. 2002 at 212-213, 2003 at 301-302,
333-334, 380-381, 397; 1718 (Findings of Fact 1 13.6, Ex. 17)], which letter was
delivered to Central Utah Title, along with the bank's trust deed, a warranty deed, the
bank's check payable to Central Utah Title in the amount of $8,500 [Ex. 2] and the
Youngs' check payable to Central Utah Title in the amount of $1,500 [Ex. 2; R. 2002 at
119-120, 2003 at 301-302, 310-311, 333-334.]
Pursuant to the letter of instructions, Central Utah Title conducted a title search and
discovered that title to the property was clouded by two personal judgments against Don
Olsen, i.e., a judgment in favor of Central Bank and Trust [Ex. 30] and a judgment in
favor of Federal Land Bank [Ex. 3 1 ; R. 2003 at 304, 306, 336-337; 1719 (Findings of Fact
1f 18)]. Consequently, as Judge Mower found, "The sale was not closed. No funds were
disbursed. No deeds were recorded." [R. 1719 (Findings of Fact t 18).] Central Utah
Title informed Don Olsen of the title encumbrances. [R. 2003 at 93, 308-309, 417.]
Olsen informed Robert Young of the encumbrances and requested Dale Dorius, Don
Olsen's attorney, to work on clearing title. Central Utah Title issued its commitment for
title insurance on December 10, 1992, which showed the judgments against Don Olsen
as encumbering title to the property. [R. 2003 at 303-306; 1719 (Findings of Fact 1 18).|

7
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Although the Youngs deposited the total sum of $10,000 in escrow for the
transaction, the parties did not have an agreement on the purchase price. In January
1993, Don Olsen met with Robert Young and asked for an additional $480, based upon
a price of $1,000 per acre (the property consisting of 10.48 acres), and not $10,000 as a
flat sum for the property. [R. 2002 at 70-72, 90-91, 123-124, 266; 1720 (Findings of
Fact 121).]
The Youngs farmed the subject property during the 1993 season as they had the
prior two seasons. [R. 2002 at 74, 113, 162, 164.] The Youngs did not erect any
structures, fences, or make any improvements on the property. [R. 2002 at 202.] Don
Olsen contacted Robert Young on December 16, 1993 to request reimbursement for
property taxes. Young indicated that he would reimburse the taxes but did not do so.
[R. 2002 at 72-74, 771 186.]
In December 1993, title had still not been cleared and the warranty deed, trust
deed, and purchase money remained in escrow at Central Utah Title. As a result, the
Youngs elected to terminate the escrow by withdrawing their purchase money.
[R. 2002 at 76, 135, 138-139, 203, 220, 407.]
In late May 1994, Larry Patterson approached Don Olsen to ask if he could
purchase the subject property. [R. 2002 at 143-144, 427.] Olsen explained to Patterson
that a prior attempt to sell had failed because two judgments could not be cleared from
the property. Patterson offered to purchase the property for $10,000 and to assist in
clearing the judgment liens from the property. [R. 2002 at 85.]

8
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On June 17, 1994, the Olsens executed and delivered to Central Utah Title a
warranty deed describing the subject property for the purpose of conveying the subject
property to Larry Patterson or his designee. [R. 2002 at 109-110; Ex. 14.] Patterson
Construction was designated as the purchaser. [R. 2002 at 110.] The transaction
between the Olsens and Patterson Construction was closed and a warranty deed
conveying title to Patterson Construction was recorded on September 2 1 , 1994.
[R. 2003 at 327, 338; Ex. 14.]
In August 1994, after the Olsens had agreed to sell the property to Patterson
Construction, the Youngs tendered to Olsen the payment of property taxes and the
previously withdrawn $10,000 at the advice of the Youngs' attorney. [R. 2002 at
204-205, 260, 270.] The Olsens rejected the tender because the Youngs had previously
terminated their transaction and escrow and the Olsens had subsequently agreed to sell
to Patterson Construction. [R. 429-30; Ex. 24.]
Judge Mower found that by withdrawing their funds from the escrow, the Youngs
terminated the escrow transaction and waived any right to enforce the oral agreement.
[R. 1 724.] Judge Mower further ruled that any agreement that the transaction could be
put on hold for an indeterminate period after the Youngs had withdrawn their purchase
money was too vague and indefinite to be specifically enforced. Nd.1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A finding of waiver is a mixed question of law and fact which is entitled to
substantial deference. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the decision
demonstrates that Judge Mower's finding that the Youngs terminated the oral agreement
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and waived any right to enforce the agreement was not clearly erroneous and that Judge
Mower did not abuse his discretion. Moreover, Judge Mower did not abuse his
discretion in his alternative determination that the claimed oral agreement to put the
transaction on hold indefinitely was too vague and uncertain for specific performance.
Where there was no writing evidencing the agreement and the existence of the
transaction is dependent on an escrow, Judge Mower was well within his discretion in
concluding that the transaction was terminated when the escrow was cancelled by the
Youngs. Judge Mower's decision can also be affirmed on the grounds that the oral
purchase agreement is void under the statute of frauds and failed for want of
consideration because there was no mutuality of obligation.
With regard to the disqualification of Judge Mclff, the Youngs have no basis for
appeal. They have no protectable interest in having their case heard by a specific judge.
In any event, Judge Harding correctly ruled that the affidavit of disqualification filed
under Rule 63(b) was adequate.
ARGUMENT
I.

IUDGE MOWER DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN RULING THAT YOUNGS WERE
NOT ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
The Youngs challenge Judge Mower's decision that the Youngs were not entitled to

specific performance because they "waived any claim they might have had when they
withdrew their money from the escrow agent, Central Utah Title" and that the alleged
agreement to put the transaction on hold indefinitely was "too vague and open-ended to
be enforceable." [R. 1724.] Judge Mower's decision does not constitute an abuse of the
broad discretion granted to a trial court in specific performance cases. Moreover, the
10
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factual determinations inherent in Judge Mower's decision are supported by substantial
evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
A.

ludge Mower Properly Acted Within his Broad Discretion in Determining that
the Youngs' Contract Was Terminated Upon their Withdrawal of Funds from
Escrow.

At trial, the defendants argued that no enforceable contract ever existed between
the Youngs and Olsens by operation of the statute of frauds or, alternatively, that the
agreement was too vague or uncertain for the court to order specific performance.
[R. 1639-1654, 2003 at 470-479.] Judge Mower found that the Youngs and Olsens had
formed an oral agreement for the purchase and sale of the subject property, but that the
Youngs terminated or "waived" the agreement when they withdrew their purchase
money from escrow in December 1993. [R. 1723.] The Youngs challenge this decision
based on several principles of contract law that have nothing to do with the basis for
Judge Mower's decision. In essence, the Youngs assert that once they tendered their
performance, the Olsens were obligated to perform or be in default [appellants' brief
p. 19]; that the Youngs could not be in default until Olsen tendered his performance by
clearing title Hd. p. 20]; that the tender of the purchase funds conditioned upon the
delivery of marketable title did not impose a new condition on the transaction [id.]; and
that Olsen allegedly breached the covenant of good faith by failing to timely clear
encumbrances from title to the property [id. p. 21]. Those arguments amount to nothing
more than a disagreement with Judge Mower's ruling that, based on all the
circumstances, the Youngs elected to "waive" or rescind the oral agreement.
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Because Judge Mower concluded that an oral agreement existed, the Youngs had
certain options when the Olsens were unable to deliver unencumbered title. In
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990), this court recognized
that "a vendor is allowed a reasonable time to perfect title," id. at 724 n.3, but where the
vendor is unable or refuses to perfect title against an encumbrance, the non-breaching
party has three options:
1.

Treat the entire contract as broken and sue for damages.

2.

Treat the contract as still binding and wait until the time arrived for its
performance and at such time bring an action on the contract.
Rescind the contract and sue for money paid or for value of the services or
property furnished.

3.

id. at 724 n.4 (quoting Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co., 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P.2d
794, 796 (1968)). Consequently, the issue here is whether the Youngs elected to treat
the contract as broken and rescinded the contract by withdrawing their funds from
escrow. Judge Mower ruled that the Youngs terminated or waived the agreement by
withdrawing their purchase money. That decision is entitled to substantial deference and
was well within the trial court's discretion.
The standard for the trial court's determination of waiver and the standard of review
on appeal were restated by this court in Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlic, 890 P.2d 7
(Utah App. 1995):
The elements of waiver consist of: "(1) an existing right, benefit, or
advantage; (2) knowledge of the existence of that right, benefit or advantage;
and (3) an intention to relinquish the right, benefit, or advantage."
. . . . Over time, our courts "appeared to have developed hopelessly
inconsistent elaborations on the basic statement of waiver principles." State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). The Supreme Court "acknowledged
that fact as well as the futility of attempting such elaborations." Id. at 938.
Accordingly, the court "stripped the statement of the law back to its most
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basic form and told the trial courts to apply it." ]d.; accord Soters, 857 P.2d
at 942.
The net effect is that the doctrine of waiver is a "'highly fact-dependent
question, one that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because
we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a course
of such decisions/" Trolley Square Associates v. Nielsen, 886 P.2d 6 1 , 65
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 938). Thus, we now grant very
broad discretion to the trial court's application of legal propositions to the
facts in waiver cases. Pena, 869 P.2d at 938.
]d. at 9-10 (emphasis added); see State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); Trolley
Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 6 1 , 65 (Utah App. 1994) (trial court has broad
discretion in application of facts to the legal standard of waiver which is a mixed
question of fact and law).6
To challenge the trial court's finding of waiver, appellants must also satisfy the
marshalling requirement. That is, they must "marshal evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking
in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.'" Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999) (quoting In re Estate of
Battel I. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). The Youngs have presented selected facts in
support of their own position, but have failed to marshal the evidence supporting Judge

6

The Youngs cite Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481 (Utah 1975),
and Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987), as requiring clear and
unequivocal evidence that a party has abandoned rights under a contract [appellants'
brief at 29]. Both of those decisions recognize, however, that whether a party intends to
waive or abandon rights is a question of fact, subject to the clearly erroneous standard of
review. Both cases also pre-date Soters, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings and Loan
Association, 57 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993), in which the Utah Supreme Court disavowed de
novo review of waiver decisions in favor of increasing the trial court's discretion in cases
involving mixed questions of law and fact. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938 ("waiver is a
highly fact-dependent question, one that we cannot profitably review de novo in every
case.").
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mower's decision and then show that the marshalled evidence is legally insufficient to
support the findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable
to the decision. Consequently, this court must assume that Judge Mower's finding of
waiver is correct. See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998);
lohnson v. Higlee, 977 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Utah App. 1999).
In any event, Judge Mower's finding of waiver is not clearly erroneous since there
is substantial evidence in the record to support his findings. See louflas v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 1996); Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36
(stating factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are "not adequately supported by the
record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination").
Both Don Olsen and Robert Young testified that they made only an oral, not a
written, agreement regarding the purchase and sale of the subject property. [R. 2002 at
90-91, 114, 211-212.] Don Olsen testified that the agreement was that he would furnish
a deed and that "the papers would be held by Central Utah Title until the money was
received and the paperwork was completed and everything to their satisfaction and then
the deed would be recorded and I would get the money." [R. 2002 at p. 92.] The
parties agreed that the sale would be completed prior to November 16, 1992 so that
Don Olsen could use the proceeds to save his home from a pending foreclosure.
[R. 2002 at 52, 114, 397, 415.]
The Youngs borrowed their purchase money from the Bank of Ephraim to be
secured by a trust deed against the subject property. [R. 2002 at 116, 171].] The Bank
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of Ephraim issued a check payable to Central Utah Title, a trust deed to secure its loan,
and a letter of instructions conditioning the closing on clear title. [R. 2006 at 116, 119,
209-210.] 7 Gerald Naylor, manager of the Bank of Ephraim, testified that the letter was
intended to instruct the title company not to disburse funds or close the transaction until
title was cleared. [R. 2003 at 397-398.] Robert Young testified that he read Naylor's
letter and that he knew the transaction would not close unless title could be cleared.
[R. 2002 at 212-213.]
The title company discovered two substantial judgment liens against Olsen and
advised him of the problem. In turn, Olsen testified that a day or two after learning of
the encumbrances, "I went and told Mr. Young that there was a problem and I would do
what I could to get it solved for him." [R. 2002 at 78, 93-94, 2003 at 41 7.] Over the
next year, Olsen made efforts to resolve the judgment liens both personally and through
his counsel, Dale Dorius. [R. 2003 at 310, 419, 428-429.] During that period of time,
the purchase money, the bank's trust deed, and the conveyance deed remained in
escrow at Central Utah Title. [R. 2003 at 316-317.] The Youngs made no improvements
to the property, but only farmed it consistent with what they had done in the prior three
years under a leasing arrangement. [R. 2002 at 202.]

7

The letter stated:
Enclosed are the funds, trust deed, deed on the property Robert Young is
purchasing from Edwin Donald Olsen. We need to make sure there is clear
title and we have in hand eleven shares of Sterling irrigation stock before
disbursement is made.
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Olsen testified that on December 16, 1993, he contacted Mr. Young for
reimbursement of property taxes that he had paid on the subject property. [R. 2002 at
72-74, 77, 186; Ex. 16.] Despite that request, the Youngs failed and refused to pay the
taxes, evidencing their intent not to continue with the transaction. [R. 2002 at 72-74,
77, 186.]
Just before Christmas 1993, Wynn Young requested, and Central Utah Title issued a
check payable to Robert K. Young in the amount of $1,500. The check contained the
following notation: "refund of monies held for sale from Don Olsen which didn't close."
[R. 2002 at 220, Ex. 20.] Wynn Young also arranged for Central Utah Title to issue its
check payable to the Bank of Ephraim in the amount of $8,500, which contained the
following notation: "refund of monies held for Don Olsen/Robert Young sale which did
not close." [R. 2002 at 221, Ex. 21.] That check was delivered to the Bank of Ephraim
on December 29, 1993. [R. 2002 at 221, 407.]
Mr. Young testified that the decision to withdraw the funds from escrow was based
on a recommendation from the Bank of Ephraim that the loan could be placed on a
"moratorium" status. [R. 2002 at 132.] Gerald Naylor from the Bank of Ephraim,
however, specifically contradicted that testimony indicating that no one from the bank
advised the Youngs to withdraw their money from the escrow, that he is not familiar
with the term "moratorium," and the Bank of Ephraim does not recognize a "moratorium"
status for any of its loans. [R. 2003 at 385.] In addition, the bank's loan records indicate
that the loan was paid off on December 29, 1993 and not placed on a "moratorium"
status. [R. 2003 at 406-407, Ex. 34.] Olsen testified that he first learned that the Youngs
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had withdrawn their money in early January 1994. [R. 2002 at 76, 2003 at 422-428.]
Olsen's January 1994 visit to the title company was confirmed by the testimony of Mark
Anderson of Central Utah Title. [R. 2003 at 316-317.] Soon after Olsen's visit to Central
Utah Title, the title company sent to him an invoice dated January 10, 1994 for an
escrow cancellation fee in the amount of $120. [R. 2002 at 316-317; Ex. 32.] Olsen
paid the $120 escrow cancellation fee by check dated February 7, 1994. [R. 2003 at
411; Ex. 37]. With regard to his understanding of the status of the oral agreement after
the Youngs had terminated the escrow, Olsen testified that Young "broke the agreement
when he withdrew his money." [R. 2003 at 431.] Further, with regard to the withdrawal
of the funds, Don Olsen testified:
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Did you ever agree with the Youngs that they could take the money out of
the escrow and then buy the property at some future time?
No agreement, no discussion of that.
After you found out from Mr. Anderson [of Central Utah Title] that the
property, or excuse me, that the money had been taken back from the title
company by the Youngs, what was your understanding then of the status of
your agreement to sell the property to the Youngs?
After then at the same time, just a day or two later getting the cancellation
billing from Central Utah Title to me it was ended as far as this particular sale.
So at that point in time it was your belief and understanding that you had no
further obligation to sell the property to them?
That is right.

[R. 2003 at 427.] Between December of 1993 and June of 1994, the Youngs made no
further inquiries with regard to the property and gave no indication to Olsen that they
still desired or intended to purchase the property. [R. 2003 at 427.]
Mark Anderson of Central Utah Title testified that the title company accepted the
letter of instructions and the deposit of the deed and funds as an escrow agent.
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[R. 2003 at 334.] The funds were never disbursed and the deed was not recorded
because the escrow instructions could not be met. [R. 2003 at 310-315.] Anderson
further testified that after the title company refunded the escrowed monies and issued an
invoice for cancellation of the escrow, that the transaction between the Olsens and the
Youngs was terminated. [R. 2003 at 342.]
In late May or early June 1994, Larry Patterson contacted Don Olsen about
purchasing the subject property. [R. 2002 at 143-144.] Olsen explained to Patterson
that a prior attempt to sell the property had failed because two judgments could not be
cleared from the property. Olsen agreed to sell the property to Patterson for $10,000 if
Patterson could assist in clearing the judgment liens. [R. 2002 at 80-81, 85-86.] An
escrow for that transaction was also established through Central Utah Title. [R. 2003 at
319-325.] Anderson of Central Utah Title testified that he was not surprised by a new
transaction since the earlier one between the Olsens and Youngs had been terminated
and that it is not uncommon in the title business that property is sold to a different buyer
after a transaction has failed. [R. 2003 at 342.]
On June 17, 1994, the Olsens executed and delivered to Central Utah Title a
warranty deed describing the property for the purposes of conveying the property to
Patterson or his designee. [R. 2003 at 320; Ex. 14.] With the help of Patterson, Olsen
was successful in negotiating a settlement and satisfaction of the judgment liens.
[R. 2002 at 85-86.] Patterson Construction was designated as the purchaser after its
check in the amount of $10,000 was deposited with Central Utah Title [R. 2003 at 326,
343; Ex. 33]. The transaction between the Olsens and Patterson Construction was closed
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and the warranty deed conveying title to the subject property to Patterson Construction
was recorded on September 2 1 , 1994. [R. 2003 at 338; Ex. 14.]
The subject property is surrounded by other property owned by the Pattersons.
[R. 2002 at 231, 234, 237.] Young admitted in his testimony that he disliked Larry
Patterson and that he had disagreements with the Pattersons. [R. 2002 at 199-201, 203.]
It was not until after Young found out that Olsen had agreed to sell the property to Larry
Patterson and that Larry Patterson had assisted Olsen in clearing the encumbrances that
the Youngs suddenly became interested again in purchasing the property. [R. 2002 at
202-203.]
As the trial judge, Judge Mower is "considered to be in the best position to assess
the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole,
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record." State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); accord Poulsen v. Frear. 946 P.2d 738, 742-43 (Utah
App. 1997). Based on the circumstances, Judge Mower was in the best position to
evaluate the state of mind of the Youngs, including their motivation and intent in
withdrawing the funds from escrow. Judge Mower properly considered the Youngs'
inaction with regard to the purchase of the property and the fact that their desire to
purchase was renewed only after they found out the Pattersons had agreed to purchase
it. Judge Mower's decision that the Youngs terminated the agreement and waived their
right to seek enforcement, must be affirmed. 8

8

The Youngs also argue that certain evidence of their use of the property was
improperly excluded at trial. [Appellants' brief at 27, 29.] The specific relevance
objection sustained by the trial court was directed to a question posed to Mr. Young
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B.

ludge Mower Did Not Abuse his Discretion in Refusing to Grant Specific
Performance.

As an alternative ruling, Judge Mower refused to grant specific performance on the
ground that any alleged agreement that the transaction could be placed on hold for an
indeterminate period was too vague and indefinite to be enforceable. The Youngs
acknowledge in their brief that specific performance is an equitable remedy addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court [see appellants' brief p. 19], but fail to analyze
Judge Mower's ruling in light of the correct standard of review.
The court of appeals can reverse the trial court's ruling on specific performance
only if it finds abuse of discretion. See, e.g.. Shields v. Harris. 934 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah
1997). The standard was explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Morris v. Sykes. 624
P.2d 681 (Utah 1981):
Specific performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed to the sense of
justice and good conscience of the court, and accordingly, considerable
latitude of discretion is allowed in his determination as to whether it shall be
granted and what judgment should be entered in respect thereto; and his
ruling thereon should not be upset on appeal unless it clearly appears that he
has abused his discretion. . . .
]d. at 684 (emphasis added).

regarding any conversations he had with Larry or Karen Patterson in the summer of
1994, several months after the Youngs had withdrawn their purchase money. [R. 2002
at 149, 257.] Judge Mower correctly concluded that anything said by the Pattersons
would not be relevant as to the intent of the Youngs and Olsens. [R. 2002 at 260.]
Because the two questions were designed to elicit irrelevant information, Judge Mower
properly exercised his broad discretion to sustain the objections. See Larsen v. lohnson.
958 P.2d 953, 956-57 (Utah App. 1998) (relevancy ruling subject to review only for
abuse of discretion). In any event, there could be no error with regard to the exclusion
of testimony about conversations with Larry or Karen Patterson about the Youngs' use of
the property because, as the Youngs admit in their brief, they were permitted to put into
evidence their own testimony about their use of the property. [Appellants' brief at 27.]
20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Under Utah law, "specific enforcement of a contract depends on whether the
obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient clarity and definiteness that the
contract can be performed according to its terms." Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 429
(Utah 1980). This court has stated:
But specific performance cannot be required unless all terms of the agreement
are clear. The court cannot compel performance of a contract which the
parties did not mutually agree upon . . . . A binding contract can exist only
where there has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention
to be bound by its terms. Furthermore, a contract can be enforced by the
courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient
definiteness that it can be performed. . . .
When the parties leave material matters so obscure and undefined that the
court cannot say whether the minds of the parties met upon all the essentials
or upon what substantial terms they agreed, the case is not one for specific
performance.
Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted).
In this case, several critical terms of the alleged agreement were not set forth at all,
let alone with sufficient definiteness to permit specific performance. With regard to the
initial agreement to purchase, there was no meeting of the minds on the purchase price.
The Youngs initially deposited $10,000 in escrow as the purchase price, but Olsen later
insisted that the price was $1,000 per acre for the 10.48 acres. [R. 2002 at 70-72,
123-124, 266, 1720 (Findings of Fact 1 21).]
Time was of the essence when the agreement was entered into to generate funds
for Olsen to stave off the foreclosure of his home. At that time, Olsen was under the
mistaken understanding that the subject property was not held in his name and that
judgment liens, therefore, would not attach to it. [R. 2002 at 46-51.] After Olsen
learned from Central Utah Title of the judgment lien encumbrances, he testified that he
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told Young he would do what he could to clear the judgment liens, but he had no idea
what that might be since the amount of the encumbrances was substantial. [R. 2003 at
444.] j o the extent that an agreement existed, Olsen understood that the escrow would
remain intact and that he would at least be entitled to receive interest on the escrowed
funds while title was being cleared. [R. 2003 at 422.] He also understood that the
Youngs would be responsible to pay property taxes and requested reimbursement of the
taxes. [R. 2002 at 186, 2003 at 421.] Olsen, however, did not receive any interest on
the funds, the funds were withdrawn from the escrow by the Youngs, and the Youngs
failed to pay the property taxes. Consequently, there was no definite agreement on what
time period would be permitted for title to be cleared, whether the escrow could be
terminated and the transaction put in abeyance for an indefinite period, whether the
Youngs could withdraw their purchase money for an indefinite period while title was
being cleared, whether Olsens would be paid interest or other consideration for the
Youngs' use of the property during this uncertain period, whether the Youngs would be
responsible for property taxes, and how the purchase price may be adjusted for any
increase in property values during the interim. [R. 2002 at 90-91, 114, 211-212.]
Plaintiffs cite to the general rule that the court may grant specific performance
where incidental details, such as time of performance or terms of payment, may be
implied. [See appellants' brief p. 28.] As those authorities indicate, however, where an
uncertain term may be implied such as "a reasonable time under the circumstances . . .
that is something for the trial court to determine." Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d
1240, 1242 (Utah 1980); Nixon & Nixon. Inc. v. lohn New & Assocs.. 641 P.2d 144
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(Utah 1982) ("What is reasonable is a question of fact."); see Kier v. Condrack, 478 P.2d
327 (Utah 1970) (affirming trial court's exercise of discretion to imply payment terms).
Judge Mower considered all of the circumstances here and determined that the missing
terms were not incidental or, under the circumstances, could not be implied. That
determination was well within Judge Mower's broad discretion. See, e.g., Barnard v.
Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1985) (affirming denial of specific performance based on
ambiguous legal description); BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978)
(affirming refusal of specific performance where escrow terms were uncertain); lensen v.
Bouhuis, 577 P.2d 555 (Utah 1978) (specific performance not available where certain
land release terms remained unsettled).
In BLT Investment, the parties entered a written contract for the purchase and sale
of a ranch. Provisions relating to an escrow to be established in connection with the
transaction, however, "were largely absent." BLT Investment, 586 P.2d at 457. The trial
court concluded that the agreement was too indefinite for specific performance. On
appeal, the buyer asserted, as in the instant case, that escrow terms could be implied.
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that "the disagreement here as to escrow specifics
would seem important enough that an equity court might justifiably conclude an excuse
existed for non-performance. . . ." id. at 458. In the instant case, the establishment of
an escrow at Central Utah Title was an integral part of the transaction. Since there was
no written purchase agreement stating any terms of the alleged agreement, the existence
and maintenance of the escrow itself was of paramount significance. Indeed, without the
deposit at the title company of the warranty deed, trust deed, and purchase money
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checks, there would be nothing to evidence the existence of or any terms of the
proposed transaction. Under the circumstances in this case, Judge Mower, as a court in
equity, certainly was entitled to conclude that the lack of any agreed terms regarding the
duration of the escrow, when funds could be withdrawn, whether interest would be paid
and to whom, and whether the transaction was still on after cancellation of the escrow
itself, were terms that could not be implied.
In Woodward v. lensen, 740 P.2d 272 (Utah App. 1987), this court recognized:
where a certain event or situation is essentially made a condition to an
agreement, the absence of such event or situation precludes specific
performance of the agreement.
id. at 274. In Woodward, the parties agreed that the subject property would need to be
in a recorded subdivision plat. After the sales agreement was signed, however, they
discovered that the county had changed subdivision requirements, making it impossible
for the plat to be recorded. Since an event that was essentially a condition of the
agreement did not exist, specific performance was not required. In the instant case, the
existence of the escrow was deemed by Judge Mower to be essential to the existence of
the purchase agreement. It was well within Judge Mower's discretion to conclude that
once that situation no longer existed (because the Youngs voluntarily withdrew their
purchase money from escrow), specific performance was not an appropriate remedy.
In Carr v. Enix Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah App. 1989), this court recognized
that a party who seeks specific performance must act diligently:
Specific performance is a remedy of equity; and one who invokes it must
have clean hands in having done equity himself. That is, he must take care to
discharge his own duties under the contract; and he cannot rely on any mere
inconvenience as an excuse for his failure to do so. Even if inconvenience or
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difficulty is encountered, he must make an effort to perform, or to tender
performance, which manifests reasonable diligence and a bona fide desire to
keep his own promises.
]d. at 1295 (quoting Fisher v. lohnson, 525 P.2d 45, 46-47 (Utah 1974)). This court held
in Carr that the trial court properly exercised discretion not to grant specific performance
where the buyer did not take his obligations under the contract seriously until property
values skyrocketed. The conduct of the plaintiffs in the instant case is similar to Carr.
The parties here discussed a very informal escrow arrangement for the purchase and sale
of the property. Olsen informed Youngs that the transaction could not close and the
Youngs did nothing. After more than a year had passed, the Youngs failed to pay the
property taxes and voluntarily terminated the escrow by removing their purchase money.
The Youngs did not tender their purchase money again for more than eight months after
they had terminated the escrow. Their renewed interest was fueled by the fact that the
Pattersons (whom Young admittedly disliked and had disagreements with) had contracted
for the purchase of the property. The Youngs simply did not want the Pattersons to have
the property and belatedly attempted to resurrect their cancelled transaction for the
purpose of trying to prevent the Pattersons from purchasing property that was
strategically located in the center of the Pattersons' other holdings. Since the Youngs
themselves did not act diligently and have clean hands, Judge Mower acted well within
his broad discretion in refusing to grant specific performance.
C.

ludge Mower's Decision Not to Grant Specific Performance Can Be Sustained
on other Grounds.

It is well-established that the court of appeals may affirm the trial court's judgment
on any proper ground. See Webber v. Snyderville West, 800 P.2d 316 (App.), cert.
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denied, 800 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). Judge Mower's judgment may also be affirmed on
the grounds that (1) the Young/Olsen agreement is void under the statute of frauds, and
(2) the agreement failed for want of consideration.
1.

The Young/Olsen Agreement Is Void Under the Statute of Frauds.

Under the Utah statute of frauds, oral agreements for the purchase of real property
are void. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1995) provides:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
One or more writings may be considered together as a sufficient memorandum if
there is a connection between them. The memorandum, however, must set forth all of
the terms and conditions of the agreement:
Regardless of whether a memorandum is made up of one or more writings, in
order to satisfy the statute it must contain all the essential terms and
provisions of the contract to which the parties have agreed. Birdzell v. Utah
Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578, 580 (1952): see N e w .
Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114, 1118 (1956) (memorandum must
identify parties, subject matter, and "set out the conditions of the transaction
with adequate certainty"). Furthermore, "the memorandum must show what
the contract was, and not merely note the fact that some contract was made."
Collette v. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 P.2d 730, 732 (1951).
Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western Real Estate and Development Co., 779
P.2d 230, 234 (Utah App. 1989).
In this case, there is no memorandum that specifies any of the terms of the oral
agreement between plaintiffs and the Olsens. The Olsens did not sign a document
specifying the purchase price, the terms of payment, the closing date, the conditions of
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title, or any other terms and conditions of the proposed sale. [R. 2002 at 90-91, 114,
211-212, 425-427.] Moreover, there is no writing to memorialize any alleged agreement
that the purchase funds could be withdrawn from escrow without terminating the
transaction. Qd-] Because there is no memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds, the
oral agreement between the Youngs and the Olsens was void as a matter of law.
2.

The Alleged Oral Agreement Failed for Want of Consideration.

Plaintiffs withdrew their purchase money from the escrow more than a year after
the escrow had been established. Don Olsen testified that it was his understanding that
the agreement was terminated when the purchase money was withdrawn. Under these
facts, "because, buyer's promise being contingent upon conditions that had not occurred,
the contract failed for want of consideration." Bastion v. Cedar Hills Investment and
Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1991).
In Salah & Ruthe Realty. Inc. v. Campbell 89 Nev. 483, 515 P.2d 394 (1973), the
court found that a contract did not exist for failure of considerations under circumstances
nearly identical to those in this case. Where conditions to the existence of an agreement
to purchase had not been satisfied and funds were withdrawn, the court held:
no valid contract could possibly have come into existence until the condition
precedent was accomplished. It was never accomplished and the buyers'
deposit was, upon demand, returned to him. Mutuality of obligation never
arose between the buyer and the seller, therefore, no binding contract ever
existed between the parties. . . .
515 P.2d at 396.
In this case, a condition precedent to the contract between the Olsens and the
Youngs (namely delivery of unencumbered title) was not accomplished. Because the
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Youngs could withdraw their funds from escrow at any time without any obligation to
purchase the property, there was no mutuality of obligations. As a result, the Youngs
withdrew their purchase money and no contract existed between the Youngs and the
Olsens.
D.

If This Case Were Remanded, Patterson Construction Is Entitled to a Trial on
the Merits on All Remaining Issues.

The Youngs assert that because Judge Mower allegedly erred in failing to grant
specific performance, this court should correct the claimed error and grant specific
performance to the Youngs. [Appellants' brief p. 24.] In the event that this court were
to determine that Judge Mower abused his discretion in failing to grant specific
performance, Patterson Construction would still be entitled to a trial on the remaining
issues.
Because of bifurcation, the only issue tried was whether an enforceable contract
existed between the Youngs and Olsens. The trial court specifically reserved for trial at a
later date, if necessary, the issues as to whether Patterson Construction was protected
under Utah's recording act as a bona fide purchaser. Patterson Construction took
possession of the property pursuant to a warranty deed. Under Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-12 (1994), the execution and delivery of a warranty deed creates certain
presumptions regarding title including that "the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an
interest created or described by the document acted in good faith at all times." ]d.
§ 57-4A-4(f). The statutory presumptions may be overcome only by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. See lacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994).

28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Under Utah law, the unrecorded and undelivered conveyance between the Youngs
and Olsens is "void as against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property"
where the subsequent purchaser "purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable
consideration" and his conveyance is recorded first. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 (1994).
See Utah Farm Products Credit Association v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904, 906 n.2
(Utah 1997). Patterson Construction purchased the property in good faith without any
notice of the Youngs' unrecorded and undelivered deed. Consequently, Patterson
Construction would be entitled to have a trial on the remaining issues, including the
issue of whether it is a bona fide purchaser for value subject to the protection of the
recording act.
II.

THE YOUNGS' CHALLENGE TO THE DISQUALIFICATION OF IUDGE MCIFF IS
COMPLETELY WITHOUT MERIT.
Three of the Youngs' five points on appeal relate to the disqualification of Judge

Mclff. Pursuant to Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Larry Patterson filed
an affidavit seeking Judge Mclff s recusal, based in part on the judge's prior
representation of one of the other parties while in private practice. [Affidavit of Larry
Patterson to Disqualify Judge Mclff and Certificate of Counsel of Record ("Patterson
Affidavit"), reproduced as Addendum H to appellants' brief.] Inter alia, Judge Mclff had
represented Don Olsen in his acquisition of the real estate that is the subject of this
litigation. [Patterson Affidavit \ 20.] Declining to recuse himself, Judge Mclff referred
the Patterson Affidavit to another judge, and Judge Harding of the Fourth Judicial District
Court determined that the allegations contained in the Patterson Affidavit were sufficient
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to merit Judge Mclff's disqualification. [Memorandum Decision, reproduced as
Addendum E to appellants' brief.]
A.

ludge Mclffs Disqualification May Not be Reviewed on Appeal.

Even if the Youngs' arguments against Mclff's disqualification had merit, which they
do not, the Youngs would have no standing to appeal it.
The effect of [the trial judge's] decision to step aside is merely to have the
case reassigned to another judge of the district court. The order does not strip
plaintiffs of a fair forum in which they can pursue their claims. . . . While
plaintiffs have a right to have their claim heard by the district court, they have
no protectable interest in the continued exercise of jurisdiction by a particular
judge.
Hampton v. Chicago, 643 F.2d 478, 479 (7th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added); accord In re
Cement Antitrust Litigation, 688 F.2d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982) afPd sub nom Arizona
v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 459 U.S. 1191 (1983) ("when a trial judge enters an order granting a
motion for disqualification, the error, if any, cannot serve as a basis for reversal on
appeal" (emphasis in original)); Liddell v. Bd. of Ed. of St. Louis, 677 F.2d 626, 644 (8th
Cir. 1982) (citing Hampton in support of finding that appeals court lacked jurisdiction to
review decision to recuse).
Moreover, Canon 3(E) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
disqualification where "the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The
federal courts have found that the incorporation of this standard into the governing
federal statutes "does away with the old 'duty to sit' doctrine." United States v. Kelly,
888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989) (construing 28 U.S.C. 5455(a)); see also Cellcom v.
Systems Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 195-96 (Utah App. 1997) (looking to
federal court constructions of § 455(a) to guide construction of Canon 3(E)).
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In a related vein, the Utah Supreme Court has observed that "it is ordinarily better
for a judge to disqualify himself even though he may be entirely free of bias and
prejudice if either litigant files an affidavit of prejudice and bias," Haslam v. Morrison,
113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948), and has commended the practice of doing so.
id.; State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988). This commendation would be
inexplicable unless the Utah Supreme Court agreed that while improper refusal to recuse
or disqualify might injure a party, unjustified recusal or disqualification does not.
B.

ludge Mclff's Disqualification Was justified.

Even if Judge Mclff's disqualification could properly be brought before this court, it
should be sustained. Disqualification decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See Kelly, 888 F.2d at 745; Pizzuto v. Idaho, 903 P.2d 58, 59 (Idaho 1995). Judge
Harding did not abuse his discretion in disqualifying Judge Mclff.
First, section 78-7-1 of the Utah Code expressly provides for the disqualification of
a judge where the judge has previously "been attorney or counsel for either party in the
action or proceeding." Chief Justice Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court has
explained that this provision does not mandate the disqualification of a judge hearing a
case where one of the parties is represented by the successor of a law firm with whom
the judge had been associated many years earlier. In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152
(Utah 1997). But in rendering his opinion, the Chief Justice also identified "whether the
judge had significant involvement with the client while a member of the firm" as one of
several factors that "may make it appropriate for a judge to decline to hear a case." ]d.
at 1156. In the present case, Judge Mclff had personally represented one of the parties
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in a related transaction. [Patterson Affidavit f 20.] Accordingly, the governing provision
of the Utah Code required Judge Mclffs disqualification.
Second, any doubts as to the propriety of a judge retaining a case should be
resolved in favor of disqualification. Haslam, 190 P.2d at 523; Neelev, 748 P.2d at
1094. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that Canon 3 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct "may require recusal in instances where no actual bias is
shown." Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094. At a minimum, Judge Mclffs prior representation of
one of the parties in the case in a related transaction gave rise to "a colorable claim of
bias or prejudice" justifying Mclffs disqualification. See Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094.
Thus the record contains adequate grounds for Judge Harding's decision, precluding a
finding that he abused his discretion.
C.

No Purported Procedural Irregularities Invalidate ludge Mclffs
Disqualification.

The Youngs allege several procedural infirmities in Judge Mclffs disqualification.
The Youngs claim that Patterson submitted two affidavits seeking Judge Mclffs recusal, in
violation of Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [Appellants' brief p. 31.]
But as recognized by Judge Mclffs order denying Patterson's first request for recusal, that
request was denied precisely because Patterson's unsworn letter of September 14, 1995
failed to conform to the applicable requirements. [Order in re: Request for Recusal,
reproduced as Addendum I to appellants' brief.] In his order, Judge Mclff expressly
declined "to comment on the accuracy or adequacy of the allegations contained" in
Patterson's letter. []d.] In short, as Judge Mclff himself explained, the first request for
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recusal was denied because Patterson's letter did not constitute an affidavit under the
rule. Thus, there was only one affidavit submitted by Patterson pursuant to Rule 63(b).
The Youngs object to Patterson's affidavit of January 15, 1996 on the grounds that
it was not timely filed. [Appellants' brief pp. 33-34.] Where a party's failure timely to
file the necessary affidavit threatens the waste of judicial resources and the resources of
other parties that were expended after the filing party first became aware of the judge's
bias, an objection based on timeliness might be well taken. But in the present case, it is
the Youngs' unfounded appeal that threatens to waste all of the resources expended by
the trial court and the parties through trial.
Last, the Youngs object to Judge Harding's receipt of additional materials in support
of the Patterson Affidavit and to Judge Harding's refusal to accept materials that the
Youngs wished to present in opposition. [Appellants' brief pp. 31-32.] Judge Harding
explicitly based his order disqualifying Judge Mclff on the fact that Judge Mclff had
previously represented one of the parties, a fact specifically alleged in the Patterson
Affidavit. [Memorandum Decision p. 2; Patterson Affidavit if 20.] The truth of the
allegations contained in Patterson's Rule 63(b) affidavit cannot be challenged. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 8 5 1 , 857 (10th Cir. 1976) (under 28 U.S.C. §144, which
the Compiler's Notes to U.R.C.P. 63(b) characterize as the "similar . . . federal statute,"
"although a court must pass on the legal sufficiency of an affidavit, all factual allegations
must be taken as true, notwithstanding a judge's desire to challenge the validity of the
affidavit"); Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n, 732 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo. 1987) ("When
assessing a motion for disqualification, a judge is required to accept as true the facts
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stated in the motion and accompanying affidavits"); cf. Young v. Patterson, 922 P.2d
1280, 1281 (Utah 1996) (recognizing potential for abuse under Rule 63(b) because an
affidavit may be legally sufficient even if it is "false but not demonstrably so").
Furthermore, in support of their claims, the Youngs give an unduly narrow
formulation of the interests protected by the policy of strictly limiting the materials that
may be submitted to a judge considering a Rule 63(b) affidavit. This limitation not only
prevents the unsightly involvement of a judge in determining his own objectivity, but
also serves the broader goal of avoiding every appearance of taint in the judicial system.
Cf. Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094 ("the integrity of the judicial system should be protected
against any taint of suspicion"); Zoline, 732 P.2d at 639 ("even though a trial judge
believes in his or her own impartiality, the court's duty is to eliminate every semblance
of a reasonable doubt or suspicion that a trial by a fair and impartial tribunal may be
denied" (citations omitted)). The submission of materials in support of a Rule 63(b)
affidavit comports with that broader and more fundamental goal, but permitting the
submission of materials in opposition to the affidavit would transform requests under
Rule 63(b) into adversary proceedings, and would not comport with that goal. Cf.
Young, 922 P.2d at 1281 ("the dimensions of a rule 63(b) proceeding are extremely
circumscribed").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Patterson Construction respectfully submits that the trial
court's judgment must be affirmed. Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Patterson Construction requests an award of its costs.
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DATED this ft " ' d a y of December, 1999.
PARR WAfiDOUPS BROWN^GEE & LOVELESS

By:
RonalcFu. Russell, Esq
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant
Patterson Construction, Inc.
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DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH
160 North Main
.^Jt/EuJU.
Manti, UT 84642
Telephone: 801-835-2131 Fax: 801-835-2135

ROBERT K. YOUNG and WYNN P.
YOUNG,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

DECISION
Case No. 940600742

Assigned Judge: David L. Mower

EDWIN DONALD OLSEN, JAY DONALD
OLSEN, SCOTT DOUGLAS OLSEN,
LARRY PATTERSON, and PATTERSON
CONSTRUCTION, INC,
Defendants.

This case represents a rather long and complex saga between the parties. In an effort to
simplify the resolution of the entire conflict, it was decided to first resolve that portion of it
related to a certain transaction between the plaintiffs and the Olsen defendants.
A trial was held in Manti, Utah on August 20 and 21, 1997. All of the parties made
"appearances" at the trial, but only part of the total conflict was presented - that part related to
the relationship between the Youngs and the Olsens.
The lawyers in attendance were Douglas L. Neeley, Paul D. Lyman, Ronald G. Russell,
Karen M. Patterson and Keith L. Stoney, although Ms. Patterson and Mr. Stoney did not
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -2participate. Mr. Neeley represented the Youngs, Mr. Lyman the Olsens and Mr. Russell Patterson
Construction, Inc.
The parties in attendance were the Youngs, Edwin Donald Olsen, Larry Patterson and
Patterson Construction, Inc. No one ever claimed anything for the fact that two of the Olsen
defendants did not attend.
The evidence offered at the trial was in the form of the oral testimony of six witnesses and
the contents of thirty-three exhibits.1 The witnesses were: Edwin Donald Olsen, Robert Keith
Young, Wynn Paulsen Young, Douglas Lee Ludvigson, Mark K. Anderson and Gerald Naylor.
At the conclusion of the trial the Court asked the three participating lawyers to prepare
proposed Findings of Fact. This has been done. Mr. Neeley submitted a proposal. Mr. Lyman and
Mr. Russell worked together and submitted a joint proposal. Both proposals were submitted on
computer disk. This allowed me to make a side-by-side comparison, which has been very help&l.
There is sufficient evidence to allow the Court to conclude that the following status exists
and that these events occurred:
Findings of Fact
1.

All of the parties are individuals, except Patterson Construction, Inc., which is a

corporation. The Youngs are married to each other. Edwin Donald Olsen is the father of Scott

The Clerk actually numbered exhibits 1 through 37, but some were not received.
9709181.sa
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -3Douglas Olsen and Jay Donald Olsen. Edwin Donald Olsen told the Court that he is 66 years
old. I estimate the Youngs to be older than 45 (my apologies if I have guessed incorrectly.) Mr.
Young told the Court that he has lived in Sanpete County for 35 years. For convenience, I will
refer to Robert K. Young as Robert or Bob, Wynn P. Young as Wynn and Edwin Donald Olsen
as Don.
2.

There is a parcel of land located in Sanpete County, Utah. It contains 10.48 acres.

The official records of Sanpete County contain two different descriptions because the 10.48-acre
parcel was offered for sale at the 1988 tax sale where the Olsen sons purchased 1.01 acres. The
descriptions are:
Parcel 1: Beginning 20 chains West, South 4.33 chains, West
0.73 of a chain, South 7° West 3.36 chains, South 15° West 4.34
chains, and South 34° West 3.69 chains from the Northeast
corner of Section 5, Township 19 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; thence West 15.40 chains, thence South
5°45f East along railroad right of way 44.20 feet, thence East
989.56 feet, thence North 27° East 49.36 feet to the point of
beginning. Containing 1.01 acres.

Parcel 2: Beginning 20 chains West, South 4.33 chains, West
0.73 of a chain, South 7° West 3.36 chains, South 15° West 4.34
chains, South 34° West 3.69 chains and South 27° West 49.36
feet from the Northeast corner of Section 5, Township 19 South,
Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 989.56
feet, thence South 5°45f East 483.80 feet, thence East 1.13
chains, thence South 47° East 3.19 chains, thence South 39° 15*
East 2.59 chains, thence East 3.22 chains, thence North 27° East
841.64 feet to the point of beginning. LESS 2.25 acres in the
9709181^a
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -4County Road and Highland Canal. Containing 9*47 acres.
3.

The Youngs and Don had been neighbor farmers for many years in an area west of

the town of Sterling, Sanpete County, Utah. The 10.48-acre parcel was part of a larger farm that
Don operated.
4.

In the 1980s Don sufferedfinancialreversals.
a.

There were foreclosure sales. Both real and personal property was sold to
satisfy liens. The Youngs attended a farm equipment foreclosure sale where
they purchased a manure spreader.

b.

On February 21, 1990 a judgment was entered in this Court against Don in
a case entitled Central Bank and Trust Company vs. Edwin Donald Olsen
and others, case number 9702. The amount of the judgment was
$187,579.75.

c.

On September 11, 1990 a judgment was entered in this Court against Don
in a case entitled Western Farm Credit Bank, f7k/a the Federal Land Bank
of Sacramento vs. Edwin Donald Olsen and others, case number 9620. The
amount of the judgment was $32,947.44. This judgment represented a
deficiency balance due after a foreclosure sale.

5.

Don had purchased the 10.48-acre parcel and eleven shares of stock in the Sterling
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -5Irrigation Company through a straw man. All of the documents relating to that purchase,
including the deed and the stock certificate, had remained in the possession of an escrow agent.
Hence, through all of thefinancialreversals, Don's name never appeared in any official records as
the owner of this property. One of the people in this straw-man transaction was named Rogers.
6.

In the spring of 1990 the Youngs took possession of the 10.48-acre parcel. They

irrigated it with the water represented by the 11 shares of stock and raised a crop of alfalfa hay.
They gave Don one-third of the crop as payment for use of the land and the water. The Youngs
remained in possession on the same basis in 1991 and 1992.
7.

The Bank of Ephraim is a bank doing business in Ephraim, Sanpete County, Utah.

In 1992 it was the beneficiary of a trust deed with power of sale which had been granted to it by
Don and his wife and which related to Mr. and Mrs. Olsen's home in Manti, Sanpete County,
Utah, which, in turn, was the security for a promissory note that they had signed in favor of the
bank.
8.

Because of a delinquency in payment, the Bank had caused a trustee's sale to be

scheduled for November 16, 1992.
9.

Don decided that he would try to sell the 10.48-acre parcel and the water shares. If

successful, he would use the funds to prevent the trustee's sale of his home. He was able to obtain
the deed and stock certificate from the escrow agent.
10.

Don said to the Youngs, "I will sell you the Rogers piece for $10,000.00 and 11
9709181.sa
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -6shares of water for the delinquent water assessments. They are free and clear of liens except for
the assessments. I need to save my home from a foreclosure sale scheduled for November 16,
1992." Youngs said, "OK, but we'll have to borrow part of the money. We'll use the land and
stock for security to obtain a loan."
11.

Don went to Central Utah Title and had a deed prepared. This deed was presented

in Court as exhibit number 1. It lists Edwin Donald Olsen, Jay Donald Olsen and Scott Douglas
Olsen as grantors, and Robert K. Young and Wynn P. Young as grantees. It was signed on
November 9, 1992.
12.

On November 10, 1992 Sterling Irrigation Company issued its stock certificate

number 637 to Edwin Donald Olsen for 11 shares of stock.
13.

On November 13, 1992 the following events occurred:
a.

The Bank of Ephraim issued two cashier's checks, one in the amount of
$1,500.00 payable to Central Utah Title and the other in the amount of
$8,500.00 payable to Central Utah Title and Robert K. Young, Both of
these checks had been purchased by the Youngs. The smaller check was
purchased with Youngs' own funds, while the larger was purchased with
the proceedsfroma promissory note which the Youngs had signed in favor
of the bank and which was to be secured by the land and the stock.

b.

The Bank issued a letter to Central Utah Title. It was signed by Gerald
9709I81.sa
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -7Naylor, Exec. Vice President. The text is:
Enclosed are the funds, Trust Deed, deed on the property Robert
Young is purchasingfromEdwin Donald Olsen. We need to make
sure there is clear title and we have in hand 11 shares of Sterling
Irrigation stock before disbursement is made.
c.
14.

Central Utah Title deposited the two cashier's checks into its trust account.

On November 14, 1992 Don signed the "transfer" section of stock certificate

number 637. It reads:
For Value Received I hereby sell, assign and transfer unto Robert K. & Wynn P.
Young 11 (Eleven) shares of Capital Stock represented by the within Certificate ...
15.

On November 16, 1992 the trustee's sale was conducted. The Bank of Ephraim

was the successful bidder for the Olsens' home.
16.

On November 20, 1992 Bob paid $1,997.00 to Sterling Irrigation Co. Of that

amount, $1,112.00 represented delinquent assessments, penalty and interest on the 11 shares.
17.

On a date between November 14, 1992 and November 30, 1992 Sterling Irrigation

Company issued a stock certificate to the Youngs for 11 shares. Bob took it to the Bank of
Ephraim and left it there as security for the promissory note he and Wynn had signed.
18.

On December 10, 1992 Central Utah Title issued its commitment for title

insurance on the 10.48 acres. It contained 5 exceptions or clouds on the title: 1 relating to current
unpaid taxes, 2 relating to easements and thefinal2 being the judgments referred to herein. The
sale was not closed. No funds were disbursed. No deeds were recorded.
9709181.sa
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -819.

On December 15, 1992 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $200.00 on their

loan. The Bank applied $116.63 toward principal and $83.37 towards interest.
20.

On January 19, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $208.06 on their loan.

The Bank applied $118.10 toward principal and $89.96 towards interest
21.

On January 21, 1993 Don went to the Youngs and said, "The deal was $1,000.00

per acre, not $10,000.00. Since there are 10.48 acres, you owe me $480.00" Wynn paid Don
$480.00.
22.

On February 17, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $198.06 on their

loan. The Bank applied $124.56 toward principal and $73.50 towards interest.
23.

On March 24, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $ 188.06 on their loan.

The Bank applied $100.66 toward principal and $87.40 towards interest.
24.

On April 16, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $188.06 on their loan.

The Bank applied $131.33 toward principal and $56.73 towards interest.
25.

On May 17, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $188.06 on their loan.

The Bank applied $112.82 toward principal and $75.24 towards interest.
26.

On June 16, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $188.06 on their loan.

The Bank applied $116.27 toward principal and $71.79 towards interest.
27.

On July 15, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $188.06 on their loan. The

Bank applied $119.67 toward principal and $68.39 towards interest.
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -928.

On August 17, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $146.12 on their loan.

The Bank applied $69.49 toward principal and $76.63 towards interest.
29.

On September 15, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $188.06 on their

loan. The Bank applied $121.33 toward principal and $66.73 towards interest.
30.

On October 15, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $188.06 on their loan.

The Bank applied $120.12 toward principal and $67.94 towards interest.
31.

On November 15, 1993 the Youngs paid the Bank of Ephraim $188.06 on their

loan. The Bank applied $116.75 toward principal and $71.31 towards interest.
32.

On November 30, 1993 Wynn paid $3,045.50 to Sterling Irrigation Co. A portion

of this money represents the assessments on 11 shares. The assessment rate was between $30 and
$35 per share.
33.

In November 1993 the Youngs timely paid their property taxes to Sanpete County

on others parcels that they owned. They had received no tax notice for the 10.48 acres. Bob went
to recorder's office to investigate where he discovered that the 10.48 acres was still in Olsens'
name.
34.

In December 1993
a.

Bob went to Don at his work. "Where is the tax notice?" " I don't have it."

b.

Bob went to Central Utah Title, "Where is the deed from Olsens to us?"
"Its still here. There were problems with judgment liens. Don can't give
9709181.sa
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -10clear title."
c.

Bob went back to Don. "What about the judgment liens? You can't give
clear title." "I know. I'll get [attorney] Dale Dorius working on it. I'll get it
cleared up."

d.

The Youngs went to the Bank of Ephraim. "The deed hasn't been
recorded. What should we do?" "Well, you could probably go take our
money back and wait and see if Olsen can get clear title. We'll be glad to
make you another loan in the future,"

35.

On December 13, 1993 Bob went to Central Utah Title and spoke with someone in

charge. Central Utah Title issued its check number 4982 for $1,500.00 payable to Robert K.
Young. It bore this notation: "Refund of monies held for salefromDon Olsen which didn't
close."
36.

On December 16, 1993 the following occurred:
a.

Don went to the Sanpete County Treasurer's office in Manti, Utah and
paid $66.94 for 1993 taxes and penalty on the 10.48 acres.

b.

Wynn went to Central Utah Title and spoke with Glen Green.

c.

Central issued its check number 4993 for $8,500.00 payable to Bank of
Ephraim. It bore this notation: "Refund of monies held for Don
Olsen/Robert Young sale which did not close." Glen hand carried the
9709181.sa
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -11check, the deed and the trust deed to the Bank of Ephraim.
37.

On December 29, 1993 the Bank of Ephraim entered a payoff of its loan to the

Youngs. It showed that it received $7,371.58, and that it applied $7,277.27 to principal and
$94.31 to interest.
38.

On January 10, 1994 Central Utah Title issued an invoice to Donald Edwin Olsen

[sic] for $120.00 for Cancellation Fee. He later paid the invoice.
39.

On November 30, 1994 Robert K. Young paid $4,162.00 to Sterling Irrigation Co.

A portion of this money represents the assessments on 11 shares. The assessment rate was
between $30 and $35 per share.
Decision
I conclude that the Youngs had a contract with the Olsens to purchase 10.48 acres for
$10,000.00. However, they waived any claim they might have had when they withdrew their
moneyfromthe escrow agent, Central Utah Title. I also conclude that the Youngs own the 11
shares of stock because they paid the agreed purchase price, i.e., the delinquent assessments,
penalty and interest.
There was testimony which, if believed, would lead to the conclusion that the Youngs and
Don made another separate agreement, the terms of which were as follows. Youngs could
withdraw the money being held by the escrow agent and return it to the bank in order to reduce
the amount of interest they were paying. In the meantime, Don would clear the liens and then the
9709181.sa
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DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -12sale would close. The evidence regarding this "agreement" was conflicting. Even if believed, the
"agreement" is too vague and open-ended to be enforceable.
Don ought to pay the Youngs an amount equal to the interest they paid to the Bank of
Ephraim. Don ought to pay the Youngs $480.00 for the amount he asked them to pay in January
1993 which was in excess of the purchase price. Don ought to get credit for the difference
between the $8,500.00 check delivered to Bank of Ephraim on December 16, 1993 and the
$7,277.27 paid on the loan on December 29, 1993.
Title to the 11 shares of Sterling Irrigation stock ought to be quieted in Youngs.
Mr. Lyman is appointed to draft the judgment. He should follow the procedure set forth in
Rule 4-504, CIA, in submitting iiygon^cmtion.
Dated this / ^

da^^i^&^p^
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

9709181.sa

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DECISION, Case number 940600742, Page -13CERTMCATE OF SERVICE
#

On October / 5 ~ ^ ; 1997 a copy of the above DECISION was sent to each of the
following by the method indicated:
Addressee

Method (M=m«L p=m pcnon. F=FIX) Addressee

*K

Method

(M=mafl. P=in person. F=Fax)

Karen M. Patterson
Attorney at Law
48 West Nova Drive
American Fork, UT 84003

#1

Ronald G. Russell
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O.Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

Keith L. Stoney
Attorney at Law
1016 East 1300 North
American Fork, UT 84003

PL

Mr. Paul D. Lyman
Attorney at Law
835 East 300 North, Suite 100
Richfield, UT 84701

Mr. Ross C. Blackham
Attorney at Law
Sanpete County Courthouse
Manti, UT 84642

Mr. Douglas Neeley
Attorney at Law
320 S. 50 W. 101-6
Ephraim,UT 84627
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Karen M. Patterson, Esq. (A6429)
48 West Nova Drive
American Fork, Utah 84003
Telephone: (801) 756-5344

B Y i i £ ^ 4 ^ _ DEPUTY

Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (A4134)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Co-Counsel for Defendant Patterson Construction, Inc.

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT K. YOUNG and WYNN P.
YOUNG,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

]
;
)
;

JUDGMENT

)

EDWIN DONALD OLSEN, JAY
DONALD OLSEN, SCOTT DOUGLAS
OLSEN, LARRY PATTERSON, and
PATTERSON CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Defendants.

;
;
;)
)»

Civil No. 940600742
Judge David L. Mower

]

The court having rendered its Decision, including its Findings of Fact, on October 15,
1997, now makes and enters the following:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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JUDGMENT, ORDER, AND DECREE:
1. Title to the eleven shares of Sterling Irrigation stock is quieted in Robert K.
Young and Wynn P. Young.
2. Title to the following-described real property in Sanpete County is quieted in
Patterson Construction, Inc.:
Parcel 1: Beginning 20 chains West, South 4.33 chains, West 0.73 of
a chain, South 7° West 3.36 chains, South 15° West 4.34 chains, and
South 34° West 3.69 chains from the Northeast corner of Section 5,
Township 19 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
thence West 15.40 chains, thence South 5°45' East along railroad
right of way 44.20 feet, thence East 989.56 feet, thence North 27°
East 49.36 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 1.01 acres.
Parcel 2: Beginning 20 chains West, South 4.33 chains, West 0.73 of
a chain, South 7° West 3.36 chains, South 15° West 4.34 chains,
South 34° West 3.69 chains and South 27° West 49.36 feet from the
Northeast corner of Section 5, Township 19 South, Range 2 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 989.56 feet, thence South 5°45'
East 483.80 feet, thence East 1.13 chains, thence South 47° East 3.19
chains, thence South 39°15' East 2.59 chains, thence East 3.22
chains, thence North 27° East 841.64 feet to the point of beginning.
LESS 2.25 acres in the County Road and Highland Canal. Containing
9.47 acres.
3. Judgment for $146.26 is awarded against Edwin Donald Olsen and in favor of
Robert K. Young and Wynn P. Young.
4. All other claims raised by plaintiffs in this action are dismissed with prejudice.
5. The counterclaims of Patterson Construction, Inc. remain for further adjudication.

2
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6. The court will determine costs in accordance with Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure upon entry of a final judgment.
DATED this 1 *

day of November, 1997.
BY THE COURT:
I

^XlXfe^
ii©nofs5] David L. Mower
District GRtart Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the D --"'day of November, 1997 a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Douglas L. Neeley, Esq.
320 South 50 West 101-6
Ephraim, Utah 84627
Karen M. Patterson, Esq.
48 West Nova Drive
American Fork, Utah 84003
Keith L. Stoney, Esq.
1016 East 1300 North
American Fork, Utah 84003
Ross C. Blackham, Esq.
160 North Main Street
Manti, Utah 84642
Paul D. Lyman, Esq.
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 / ~ \
Richfield, Utah 84701
/
[

f\

^
}

; 1w i i i i ^

Ronald\ (3.
Russell,
d
PITCQPII Esq.
Fen

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

V^

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH

Robert K. Young and Wynn P. Young,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 940600742

Edwin Donald Olsen,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Sanpete

)
)SS.
)

I, the undersigned Clerk of the Sixth District Court of the County of Sanpete, State of
Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Judgment rendered in the above
entitled action.
This judgment has been recorded in Judgment Record Number 9 of said court, at page O,
and I further certify that the foregoing papers hereto annexed constitute the Judgment Roll in said
action.
WITNESS my hand and seal of said Court hereto set on this 1st day of December, 1997 .
KRISTINE F. ANDERSON
Sanpete County Clerk

B y , / / ^ ^ ?y>77^, Z
Sharon Vetterli, Deputy Clerk
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